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Trade War, PPE, and Race
Ernesto Hernández-López*
ABSTRACT
Tariffs on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), such as face masks and gloves,
weaken the American response to COVID. The United States has exacerbated PPE
shortages with Section 301 tariffs on these goods, part of a trade war with China. This has
a disparate impact felt by minority communities because of a series of health inequity
harms. COVID’s racial disparity appears in virus exposure, virus susceptibility, and
COVID treatments. This Article makes legal, policy, and race-and-health arguments.
Congress has delegated to the United States Trade Representative expansive authority to
increase tariffs. This has made PPE supplies casualties of the trade war. In political terms,
the Trump administration prioritized increasing tariffs over public health readiness.
Regarding race, PPE shortages exemplify the socioeconomic effects of trade policies and
add to COVID’s racial disparities.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]rade wars are good, and easy to win”
—President Donald Trump, March 2, 20181

* Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, Chapman University, ehernand@chapman.edu, thanks
Deans Richard Redding and Matt Parlow for their research support, Sherry Leysen, Heather Joy, and
Tamara Carson and the staff of the Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library for their research assistance, and
Participants of the Business Law Scholars Roundtable organized by the Brooklyn Law School and
American Society of International Law International Economic Law Groups, and Professors Deepa
Badrinarayana, César García Hernández, and Olympia Duhart for comments on earlier drafts.
1
Thomas Franck, Trump Doubles Down: ‘Trade Wars Are Good, and Easy to Win,’ CNBC (Mar. 2, 2018,
10:32 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/02/trump-trade-wars-are-good-and-easy-to-win.html.
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The federal government is “not a shipping clerk”
—President Donald Trump commenting on face masks, PPE, and ventilators, March 19,
20202
In 2020, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) became a daily concern for millions
of Americans, opening a window into the complex issues of global trade and virus
protection. Worn to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (COVID) by the coronavirus,3 PPE
includes face masks, gloves, and more.4 In January, the first COVID cases in the United
States appeared.5 In March, the World Health Organization declared the virus outbreak a
global pandemic, while the United States declared it a national emergency. 6 These
declarations ignited panicked searches for PPE, followed by realizations that American
inventories were far from sufficient. These shortages reflect a global trade issue since most
PPE is imported from overseas producers. This Article examines these developments in
public health and these critically needed supplies. It also illustrates how American trade
policies exacerbated PPE shortages and identifies the racial disparities experienced by
those who need PPE.
Because of a two-year trade war with China, PPE purchases were more expensive, if
not impossible during the first few months of 2020.7 Starting in 2018, President Donald
Trump imposed new tariffs for imports from China, including tariffs on PPE. Tariffs are
taxes paid by importers when products enter the United States.8 As part of the trade war,
2

Remarks at a White House Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 7
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202000174/pdf/DCPD-202000174.pdf.
3
See Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-thecoronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited July 27, 2020).
4
See AGATA DABROWSKA & VICTORIA R. GREEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11488, PERSONAL PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT (PPE) AND COVID-19: FDA REGULATION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 1 (2020).
5
See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Michelle A. Jorden, Sarah L. Rudman, Elsa Villarino, Stacey
Hoferka,
Megan T. Patel, Kelley Bemis, Cristal R. Simmons, Megan Jespersen, Jenna Iberg Johnson, Elizabeth
Mytty,
Katherine D. Arends, Justin J. Henderson, Robert W. Mathes, Charlene X. Weng, Jeffrey Duchin, MD10;
Jennifer Lenahan, Natasha Close, Trevor Bedford, Michael Boeckh, Helen Y. Chu, Janet A. Englund,
Michael Famulare, Deborah A. Nickerson, Mark J. Rieder, Jay Shendure & Lea M. Starita, Evidence for
Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 680 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6922e1-H.pdf.
6
The WHO declaration was on March 11. See Jamie Ducharme, World Health Organization Declares
COVID-19 a 'Pandemic.' Here's What That Means, TIME (Mar. 11, 2020, 12:39 PM),
https://time.com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemic-declaration/. On March 13 President Donald Trump
declared a national emergency. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020).
7
A trade war occurs when a state uses economic harm to persuade a foreign state to agree to change its
trade policies, see c.f. Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 94 (1997).
The trade war with China includes a series of tariff actions. The first tariffs, for solar panels and washing
machines, were imposed on January 22, 2018. For a timeline, see Chad P. Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s
Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.,
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf (last updated Sept. 28,
2020).
8
This essay also uses the terms levies, taxes, and duties to also refer to tariffs. For description of how
tariffs are administered and who pays them, see Who Pays Trump’s Tariffs, China or U.S. Customer and
Companies, REUTERS (May 21, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-chinatariffs-explainer/who-pays-trumps-tariffs-china-or-u-s-customers-and-companies-idUSKCN1SR1UI. For
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the United States deployed additional tariffs, levies of either 7.5% or 25% on goods from
China,9 an important source of PPE imports. With these new tariffs, importers could pay
up to 25% more just to have their PPE purchases enter the country.10 These tariffs are in
addition to usual custom duties. The added expenses are passed on to distributors, retailers,
and consumers.11 The administration did not approve requests in 2018 and 2019 to
eliminate these tariffs for PPE.12 When the pandemic hit in 2020, PPE shortages added to
the stress already caused by quarantines, social distancing, and general panic.13 PPE is used
by a variety of actors, including for personal use and for large medical centers. PPE buyers
faced many challenges. To limit exposure to the virus, Americans re-organized their home,
work, and family lives. Because of this, they desperately looked for PPE. These scarcities
weakened a national COVID response.14 These experiences show how a trade war impacts
domestic consumers. Said simply, a trade war made PPE scarce and more expensive, just
as the pandemic converted PPE into a life-or-death necessity for millions of Americans.
This outbreak and the need for PPE critically impacts minority communities. African
Americans and Latinos are three times more likely to be infected and are nearly twice as
likely to die from COVID.15 The virus spreads more dangerously in these communities,
with greater rates of contractions, hospitalizations, and deaths.16 Because of this, health
officials worry about the coronavirus in these populations and other minority groups.17
Furthermore, these communities make up the major part of the essential work force, such
as grocery store, public transit, and home health workers, who have to work during

the basics of United States tariff policy, its history, and Congressional and Presidential roles, see
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11030, U.S. TARIFF POLICY: OVERVIEW (2018).
9
The 25% duty was imposed on July 6, 2018. See Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment
Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,710 (June 20,
2018). For key dates announcing tariffs, relevant notice and comment proceedings, and tariff deployment,
see Bown & Kolb, supra note 7; BROCK R. WILLIAMS & KEIGH E. HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IN10943, ESCALATING U.S. TARIFFS: TIMELINE 4 (2020).
10
See Chad P. Bown, Trump's Trade Policy is Hampering the US Fight Against COVID-19, PETERSON
INST. INT’L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:00 PM),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-trade-policy-hampering-us-fightagainst-covid-19.
11
See Jeanna Smialek & Ana Swanson, American Consumers, Not China, Are Paying for Trump’s Tariffs,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/business/economy/trade-war-tariffs.html.
12
See Bown, supra note 10.
13
For a description of PPE shortages and supply chain problems, see Zoë Schlanger, Begging for
Thermometers, Body Bags, and Gowns: U.S. Health Care Workers Are Dangerously Ill-Equipped to Fight
COVID-19, TIME (Apr. 20, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5823983/coronavirus-ppe-shortage/.
14
See id.; Bown, supra note 10.
15
See Richard Oppel Jr. Robert Gebeloff, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Will Wright & Mitch Smith, The Fullest Look
Yet at the Racial Inequality of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html.
16
See Kat Stafford, Meghan Hoyer & Aaron Morrison, Racial Toll of Virus Grows Even Starker as More
Data Emerges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 18, 2020),
https://apnews.com/8a3430dd37e7c44290c7621f5af96d6b. For a summary of racial disparities regarding
virus cases, testing, mortality and data collection, see Zoë Carpenter, What We Know About the Covid-19
Race Gap, THE NATION (May 4, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/covid-19-racialdisparities/.
17
This Article uses the terms Latino and African American since most of the cited studies refer to these
terms. It uses different terms when directly quoting specific sources.
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lockdowns.18 These essential workers have a critical need for PPE, typically face masks
and gloves.19 For many essential jobs, the work force is overwhelmingly female and nonwhite.20 Editorials in the medical journal Lancet described the need for PPE. 21 They
emphasized this need for health care workers who are a “country’s most valuable resource”
and explained that essential workers (largely African American or Latino) “face the
greatest risk to their lives.”22 Even though COVID is called the great equalizer, the reality
is that it spreads blindly into living, work, and health settings that are far from equal.
This Article explains how trade policies, specifically tariffs on PPE imports,
aggravate American experiences with COVID.23 The results are a disparate impact on
minority communities because of a complex mix of virus and health inequality harms. This
Article makes three arguments from legal, policy, and race-and-health perspectives. First,
the Trump administration was able to continue the trade war because the executive branch
has ample authority to implement additional tariffs. PPE and many more products are
subject to tariffs enacted pursuant to Section 301 of the International Trade Act of 1974.24
The executive branch has wide discretion to impose these levies when it determines that
foreign practices are “unreasonable or discriminatory,” and “burden or restrict” American
commerce.25 Accordingly, it applied Section 301 tariffs after determining that China
appropriates intellectual property (IP) from American businesses and engages in cyber
theft.26 This Article refers to this American trade measure as the “China Case.” The
majority of the Article’s legal arguments focus on Section 301, its procedures, and the
administration’s power to impose tariffs in Section 301 cases.
Second, the Trump administration prioritized tariffs over ensuring that Americans
could respond to the COVID pandemic. As a key part of the trade war, these tariffs try to

See HYE JIN RHO, HALEY BROWN & SHAWN FREMSTAD, CTR. ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., A BASIC
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF WORKERS IN FRONTLINE INDUSTRIES (2020), https://cepr.net/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-Frontline-Workers.pdf.
19
See id. at 5-6.
20
See JOCELYN FRYE, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, ON THE FRONTLINES AT WORK AND AT HOME (2020),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/04/22133103/WOCcorona-report-1.pdf/.
21
COVID-19: protecting health-care workers, 395 LANCET 922 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S01406736(20)30644-9; The plight of essential workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, 395 LANCET 1587
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31200-9.
22
COVID-19: protecting health-care work, supra note 21; The plight of essential workers during the
COVID-19 pandemic, supra note 21.
23
This Article focuses on the COVID response from January to May of 2020. Public health policies
continue to try to control the pandemic, with more recent outbreaks since June. Similarly, the United
States-China trade war and the Section 301 case continues.
24
See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §
2411).
25
19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1974). For a description of Section 301 and the case against China, see ANDRES B.
SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., IF11346, SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2020).
26
See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER
SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (summarizing the findings by the United
States Trade Representative’s Section 301 report of March 22, 2018, which serves as the basis for the
tariffs described). For documents from the investigation, hearings and tariffs, see Section 301 – China, OFF.
OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301china (last visited July 27, 2020).
18
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force changes in China’s IP and cyber theft practices. 27 When PPE was subjected to
additional duties the administration prioritized tariffs to compel changes in China over
public health readiness.28 A viral epidemic like COVID was a predictable threat, worrying
presidencies for decades.29 As a matter of policy in 2018 and 2019, the Trump
administration chose not to remove many PPE items from Section 301 tariffs.30 Eventually,
this exacerbated PPE shortages with price spikes and uncertainty in 2020, creating a PPE
crisis. This policy persisted. In June 2020, months after the initial outbreak, United States
Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer told Congress that the administration preferred
tariffs for PPE even though PPE is needed to fight the pandemic. 31 Section 301 protects
these political choices made by the executive branch.
Third, PPE shortages show that tariffs can exacerbate the existing health inequities
that harm communities of color. The disastrous experiences of 2020 help chart how African
Americans, Latinos, women, and other disenfranchised groups disproportionately suffer
from the harms posed by new tariffs and virus outbreaks. Governmental research and
scholarly data studies show racial inequities in COVID contraction, hospitalization, and
death rates.32 These findings are continually updated as the pandemic progresses, but they
confirm mounting evidence of racial disparities in the COVID response.33 Trump trade
policies aggravated the pandemic for workers and non-workers who need PPE.34 Critical
race health scholarship helps frame inquiries into how health policies appear race neutral
but actually result in predictable negative consequences for Black, Indigenous, People of
Color, and women.35 Racial disparity impacts the COVID response on three fronts:
coronavirus exposure, virus susceptibility, and medical treatments.36 The PPE crisis
27

See Bown & Kolb, supra note 7.
See c.f. Deborah Abrams Kaplan, How Tariffs Ravaged the COVID-19 Medical Supply Chain, SUPPLY
CHAIN DIVE (May 27, 2020), https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/coronavirus-tariffs-trade-medicalsupply-chain/578615/.
29
For history of pandemic threats and American worries, see HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 1-2 (2005), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemicresources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf. Since January 18, 2020 President Trump has been
briefed on COVID. See Ursula Perano, 10 Times Trump and His Administration Were Warned About
Coronavirus, AXIOS (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.axios.com/trump-coronavirus-warnings-46ea8006-2e194810-82c1-0f10f4f9aa97.html.
30
See Bown, supra note 10.
31
See Ana Swanson, Trump Trade Official Defends China Deal and Criticizes the W.T.O., N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/business/economy/us-trade-china-tariffs.html.
32
See infra notes 246, 252-253 and accompanying text.
33
This Article identifies the relationships between tariffs and PPE shortages, legal authority and tariffs, and
racial consequences in the COVID response. It refers to quantitative studies on COVID’s racial disparities,
demographic and occupational studies of essential and frontline workers, and scientific research on PPE’s
effectiveness against the virus. This opens up the question of how PPE shortages add to health disparities.
The essay does not make empirical claims about the effects of PPE prices, PPE supply, and PPE use by
minority groups.
34
See infra Part IV.
35
See Osagie Obasogie, Irene Headen & Mahasin S. Mujahid, Race, Law, and Health Disparities: Toward
a Critical Race Intervention, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 313 (2017); Chandra L. Ford & Collins O.
Airhihenbuwa, Critical Race Theory, Race Equity, and Public Health: Toward Antiracism Praxis, 100 AM.
J PUB. HEALTH s30 (2010); Camara Phyllis Jones, Invited Commentary: “Race,” Racism, and the Practice
of Epidemiology, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 299 (2001).
36
See Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J. L.
& BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 (2020).
28
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exemplifies the economic burdens of trade policies, while simultaneously adding to racial
disparities in health.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a picture of the PPE crisis in the
United States and how the federal government responded, focusing on January to May of
2020. Part II describes Section 301 tariffs and the United States-China trade war. Part III
explains how legal doctrine contributed to PPE shortages; and how constitutional and
administrative law afford the executive branch, primarily the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR), expansive authority to prioritize tariffs and deploy Section
301. This Part also identifies ways to reform Section 301. Part IV explores the racial
consequences of limited PPE; less protective equipment adds to racial disparities, defined
as health inequalities closely associated with race.37
I.

COVID HITS. PPE SHORTAGES APPEAR AND LINGER.

Since the pandemic began, questions about national PPE supplies have become
increasingly commonplace. PPE is worn to block infections from blood, bodily fluids, or
respiratory particles in the air and includes protective gowns, gloves, masks, goggles, and
respirator masks.38 Most PPE is intended as single use, to be worn once and then discarded
to minimize contamination. This equipment is common in health care settings, in surgery
rooms, or for patient examinations. With a pandemic, the need for PPE extends far beyond
hospitals. PPE is expected or required when people cannot keep a safe distance, for
example in a grocery store or government office. PPE items vary in terms of level of
protection and accordingly are subject to different Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
or National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) regulations.39
Importantly, the American COVID response also depends on other imports like
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment,40 including ventilators, medical device parts,
thermometers, and test swabs. These pharmaceutical and medical products have also been
in short supply and are similarly subject to Section 301 levies. China is a significant source
for these goods and PPE.41 For the sake of simplicity, this Article focuses on PPE, but
comparable analysis could track how the trade war impacts these vital products.

37

For descriptions of these terms, see Obasogie, Headen & Mujahid, supra note 35, at 31; Sara N. Bleich,
Marian P. Jarlenski, Caryn N. Bell & Thomas A. LaVeist, Health Inequalities: Trends, Progress, and
Policy, 33 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 7 (2012).
38
See DABROWSKA & GREEN, supra note 4, at 1. PPE has been proven to stop the spread of COVID. See
Derek K. Chu, Elie A. Akl, Stephanie Duda, Karla Solo, Sally Yaacoub & Holger J Schünemann, Physical
Distancing, Face Masks, and Eye Protection to Prevent Person-to-Person Transmission of SARS-CoV-2
and COVID-19: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 395 LANCET 1973 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31142-9.
39
As an example, surgical masks and N95 masks provide different levels of protection and receive different
regulatory approvals. See DABROWSKA & GREEN, supra note 4, at 1 (describing “device” under Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). There are three device classes, some require premarket submission. See 21
C.F.R. § 807.87 (2019).
40
See NINA M. HART, CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10424, COVID-19: AN OVERVIEW OF TRADE-RELATED
MEASURES TO ADDRESS ACCESS TO MEDICAL GOODS (2020).
41
See KAREN M. SUTTER, ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG & MICHAEL D. SUTHERLAND, CONG. RES. SERV.,
R46304, COVID-19: CHINA MEDICAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND BROADER TRADE ISSUES (2020).
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Importantly, PPE and medical equipment scarcities result in increased virus exposure and
aggravate medical treatments for COVID.42
For months, Americans looked for PPE, while shortages persisted.43 Shortages were
quickly evident. Describing the situation in March 2020, an Inspector General report from
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) noted that “widespread shortages of
PPE put staff and patients at risk,” with the most needed items being masks (N95, surgical,
and face shields), followed by gowns and gloves.44 This created a series of problems.45
Health care workers had to reuse and conserve PPE, which is unsafe. Some relied on
community donations or non-medical grade items, at times using homemade articles. In
early April, a nationwide medical survey reported PPE demand spiking between 3 to 17
times the usual rate, with demand at 8.6 times for face shields, 5 times for gowns, and 3.3
times for surgical masks.46 In a Washington Post-Ipsos poll from May, nearly two-thirds
of health care workers cited insufficient masks to filter airborne particles.47 The poll added
that seven in ten of these workers worried about exposing their household to the virus, 58%
said they had likely been exposed at work, and one-third said someone at work had been
infected.48 Developed in response to this PPE crisis, the web-based platform GetUsPPE
continues to report on PPE shortages.49
Price hikes and delays in finding new stock characterized this PPE crisis. PPE is
mostly sold through supply chains, which contributed to delays and shortages. Supply
chains are cross-border systems of production and distribution, organized to take advantage

42

See Schlanger, supra note 13.
See id.; Bob Herman, Health Workers Fear New Shortages of Protective Equipment, AXIOS (July 13,
2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-personal-protective-equipment-masks-problems-ebb82bb18429-489b-af64-61df2acb6818.html; Shawn Radcliffe, Why We May Run into PPE Shortages Again,
HEALTHLINE (July 16, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/why-we-may-run-into-ppeshortages-again. For a description of how PPE shortage persisted after the first six months of 2020 and are
predicted to last into 2021.
44
CHRISTI A. GRIMM, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-20-00300,
HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE
SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020, at 3 (2020), https://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf.
45
See id. at 9-10.
46
See Premier Inc., Survey: As COVID-19 Spreads to New Hotspots, Hospitals Should Prepare for up to a
17X Surge in Supply Demand, PREMIER (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.premierinc.com/newsroom/pressreleases/premier-inc-survey-as-covid-19-spreads-to-new-hotspots-hospitals-should-prepare-for-up-to-a17x-surge-in-supply-demand.
47
See Washington Post-Ipsos Coronavirus Employment Survey, April 27-May 4, WASH. POST (May 20,
2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/washington-post-ipsos-coronavirusemployment-survey-april-27-may-4/4bd8dd8b-1257-4d5f-b3c1-0af6c38f060d/; Lenny Bernstein & Alauna
Safarpour, Mask Shortage for Most Health-Care Workers Extended Into May, Post-Ipsos Poll Shows,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/mask-shortage-for-mosthealth-care-workers-extended-into-may-post-ipsos-poll-shows/2020/05/20/1ddbe588-9a21-11ea-ac723841fcc9b35f_story.html.
48
See Bernstein & Safarpour, supra note 47.
49
See Our Data, GETUSPPE.ORG, https://getusppe.org/data/ (last visited July 27, 2020); Suhas Gondi,
Adam L. Beckman, Nicholas Deveau, Ali S. Raja, Megan L. Ranney, Rachel Popkin & Shuhan He,
Personal Protective Equipment Needs in the USA During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 395 LANCET e90
(2020), 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31038-2; Nancy Crotti, Study: PPE Shortages Persist Nationwide, MASS
DEVICE (May 15, 2020), https://www.massdevice.com/study-ppe-shortages-persist-nationwide/.
43
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of overseas regulations and low labor costs.50 Supply chains result in low priced imported
goods by structuring dedicated manufacturing, transport, and purchases. Supply chain
problems in the United States caused price increases of 600% for surgical masks and 200%
for medical gowns.51 Quotes from hospital buyers describe $0.50 masks sold for $6.00 and
boxes of masks usually priced $2.28 offered for $70.00.52 As new vendors entered the void,
American buyers started to deal directly with unknown sources, often overseas, and faced
the threat of price gauging. Complicating matters, PPE shipments could be delayed by three
to six months.53 Two things contributed to this: transports from China take three weeks to
reach the United States, and China itself was recovering from the first COVID outbreak.54
These shortages happen because supply chains prioritize low prices while sacrificing
the flexibility to use alternative suppliers or to increase production.55 PPE is typically
imported from overseas producers at low prices. This system depends on predictable
supplies from China and anticipates American demand. But, when production or transport
is disrupted or demand increases, as in a sudden pandemic, the system loses control over
prices, supplies, and delivery times. This explains one aspect of the PPE crisis.
Another dimension involves the trade war, which raised PPE prices and decreased
supplies. On March 13, 2020 Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International
Economics explained how tariffs made PPE more expensive.56 Bown argued that Section
301 levies “suddenly threatened to cripple” the COVID response and disrupted “access to
medical products” when “they [were] needed the most.” 57 He identified applicable tariff
rates for PPE and medical goods from China. Using specific products’ tariff schedule codes
called “classifications,” the study detailed tariff increases and corresponding decreases in
American purchases since the trade war began. For example, the USTR imposed tariff
charges of 25% on medical headwear, hand sanitizer, thermometers, and others medical
imports from China.58 Charges of 7.5% applied to goggles, protective clothing, net
50

For a description of supply chains and PPE, see Kaplan supra note 28; SUTTER, SCHWARZENBERG &
SUTHERLAND, supra note 41. For analysis the influence supply chains exert on global trade, see Grietje
Baars, Jennifer Bair, Liam Campling, Dennis Davis, Klaas Hendrik Eller, Dez Farkas, Tomaso Ferrando,
Jason Jackson, David Hansen-Miller, Elizabeth Havice, Claire Mummé, Jesse Salah Ovadia, David
Quentin, Brishen Rogers, Jaakko Salminen & Benjamin Selwyn, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains:
A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 57 (2016); Dan Danielsen, Trade, Distribution and
Development Under Supply Chain Capitalism, in WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION 121 (Alvaro Santos, Chantal Thomas & David
Trubek eds., 2019).
51
See HART, supra note 40, at 2.
52
See GRIMM, supra note 44, at 4; Jack Nicas, It’s Bedlam in the Mask Market, as Profiteers Out-Hustle
Good Samaritans, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/technology/coronavirus-masks-shortage.html.
53
See GRIMM, supra note 44, at 3.
54
See SUTTER, SCHWARZENBERG & SUTHERLAND, supra note 41, at 2.
55
See James Randall Patrinley Jr., Sean T. Berkowitz, Danny Zakria, Douglas J. Totten, Mumin Kurtulus
&
Brian C. Drolet, Lessons from Operations Management to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic, 44 J. MED.
SYS. 129 (2020).
56
See Bown, supra note 10.
57
See id.
58
For the sake of simplicity, these names paraphrase the actual identification for the goods. They are not
the exact tariff schedule names, typically called classifications. The titles for classifications tend to be quite
detailed and long. See id. Other goods also subject to additional tariffs include: CT, monitoring, ultrasound,
x-ray, and oxygen concentrator equipment. See id.
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headwear, gloves, and more.59 Bown summarized that the overall impact of these tariffs
was a “sharp decline” in imports of critical products from China. Americans had to pay the
higher prices because changing suppliers is difficult, and domestic manufacturers had to
pay higher prices for parts and components needed for production.60
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) confirmed that the
United States was imposing these additional tariffs. In its April 2020 report to Congress, it
found 112 different classifications of imported goods related to the COVID response.61 In
June, an updated report found 203 product classifications, widening its scope to include
pharmaceuticals, ingredients to make pharmaceuticals, hospital supplies, and items needed
to administer a vaccine.62 Of these, 57% (116 classifications) were subject to Section 301
tariffs, with 89 classifications subject to the 25% tariff rate and 27 classifications subject
to the 7.5% rate.63 Accordingly, the USTR imposed the higher rate for 44% of COVIDrelated products and the lower rate for 13% of those items. The USITC also found that
thirty PPE classifications were COVID-related.64 More specifically, twenty-one PPE
classifications were subject to Section 301 tariffs.65 These studies, from Bown and the
USITC, show how PPE along with other medical supplies became casualties of the trade
war.
Put simply, as national supplies fell dramatically, Americans paid more for PPE
needed to fight and avoid COVID. Bown called for an immediate and blanket end to
Section 301 tariffs imposed on PPE and medical supplies. Other observers agreed.66

59

See id.
See id.
61
See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, COVID-19 RELATED GOODS: U.S. IMPORTS AND TARIFFS, PUB. NO.
5047, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-576 (2020), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5047.xlsx (listing
the total number in the Executive Summary).
62
See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, COVID-19 RELATED GOODS: U.S. IMPORTS AND TARIFFS (UPDATED),
PUB. NO. 5073, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-576 (2020),
https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/covid19_related_goods_us_imports_and_tariffs_commission.xlsx (listing the total number in the Executive
Summary). These names paraphrase the actual identification for the goods.
63
See id.
64
See id. at “Table 1: COVID-19 related goods duty rate and imports at the HTS 10-digit level.” This
report defined PPE as “protective materials that are worn” and distinct from COVID tests, sterilization
products, oxygen equipment, imaging and diagnostic equipment, non-PPE medical supplies, medicines, and
other health care products. See id. at “Introduction.”
65
See id.
66
See Robert B. Zoellick, Opinion, Trump’s Tariffs Leave the U.S. Short on Vital Medical Supplies, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 19, 2020, at A19 (former Trade Representative criticizing economic isolationism and tariffs for
PPE and medical supplies); Ryan Young, Report: Tariff Relief Would Help COVID-19 Recovery,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., July 8, 2020, https://cei.org/news_releases/report-tariff-relief-would-helpcovid-19-recovery/. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 28 (analyzing PPE tariff developments); Anabel
González, A Memo to Trade Ministers on How Trade Policy Can Help Fight COVID-19, PETERSON INST.
INT’L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (Mar. 23, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/tradeand-investment-policy-watch/memo-trade-ministers-how-trade-policy-can-help-fight-covid (proposing
trade policy changes for the United States and other countries); Chloe Kent, How is the US China Trade
War Hitting the Medical Device Industry, MED. DEVICE NETWORK (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.medicaldevice-network.com/features/us-china-trade-war-medical-devices/ (describing the call
for tariff exemptions from before COVID).
60
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Months later, trade war tariffs still apply to PPE imports with added costs passed on to
buyers, workers, and the health care system.67
The Trump administration had a series of responses to the PPE crisis, but avoided a
blanket end to Section 301 charges for PPE. It continued its trade war posture. This policy
called for a clear trade-off: tariffs are necessary to force important changes in China’s
policies, even if American businesses pay for price hikes and our pandemic response
suffers.
The Trump administration’s responses to the PPE crisis were piecemeal and
insufficient. Seven steps illustrate this. First, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the FDA approved changes to allow face masks certified under
NIOSH regulations for the COVID response.68 These are similar to N95 face coverings but
were approved for use in settings other than health care, such as construction work. Second,
the USTR began approving individual importer’s requests to avoid paying the Section 301
charges. Called exclusions, they began on March 6, 2020.69 Described in more detail
below, exclusions provide limited relief, since they are temporary. Third, on March 17,
2020 the CDC changed its recommendations for face masks, suggesting that health care
workers could wear less protective surgical masks, reuse masks, and even use homemade
items, instead of the prior strict recommendation for N95 masks.70 It issued similar
guidelines for eye protection and gowns.71 Fourth, on March 18, 2020 the President
invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA) to spur American industry to produce PPE and
medical equipment.72 The DPA compels private actors to prioritize sales of needed supplies
to the government.73 Actually procuring supplies is not quick—manufacturers have months
to prepare manufacturing capacities and then actually make the items. Eventually the

67

See Kaplan, supra note 28.
Encompassing a series of steps, these actions began with an Emergency Use Authorization on March 2,
pursuant to NIOSH regulations (42 C.F.R. Part 84) and the Food Drugs and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §
360bbb-3). For a summary, see FDA News Release: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA and CDC
Take Action to Increase Access to Respirators, Including N95s, for Health Care Personnel, FDA (Mar. 2,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-and-cdctake-action-increase-access-respirators-including-n95s. For a description of the regulatory steps at the
CDC, FDA, and NIOSH, see Letter from RADM Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin.,
to Robert R. Redfield, MD, Dir. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/135763/download.
69
The USTR approved exclusions on March 10, 16 and 17. See Kaplan, supra note 28.
70
See Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Facemasks, CDC (June 28, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/face-masks.html. For how these regulatory
changes were applied, see Zoë Carpenter, Health Care Workers Are Facing Burdens That Put Everyone at
Risk, NATION (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/healthcare-workers-coronavirusppe/.
71
See Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Isolation Gowns, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/isolation-gowns.html (last updated Mar. 17,
2020); Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Eye Protection, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/eye-protection.html (last updated July 15,
2020).
72
See Exec. Order No. 13,909, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,227 (Mar. 23, 2020).
73
See Bryan Bender & Megan Cassella, Will Trump Be Able to Get Emergency Medical Supplies Fast
Enough?, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2020, 7:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/18/coronavirusdefense-production-act-trump-136316.
68
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administration used its DPA powers to secure production contracts specifically for PPE.74
Fifth, the USTR opened a comment process for importers to submit details on why COVID
related goods should not be subject to Section 301 tariffs. 75 Sixth, on March 29, 2020
Project Airbridge provided expedited international transport for PPE and other needed
imports.76 Seventh, the Strategic National Stockpile began distributing PPE and other
supplies to states. By April 8, 2020 the stockpile was nearly depleted.77
Critics describe these actions as too little, too late. Observers, including members of
Congress, complained that it took the administration two months to start distributions from
the stockpile and that the federal government did not coordinate PPE procurement. 78 As
COVID hospitalizations peaked in many places, this inaction left states to compete with
each other for crucial supplies. These impressions reflect larger complaints that the
administration did not act fast enough to respond to COVID. Starting in January, it did not
recognize the real threat to Americans, support testing, include emergency management in
its response, or invoke the DPA until these actions were too late.79
As the pandemic persisted, Congress acted to secure PPE and investigate these
shortages. On March 27, 2020, it passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic

74

See Tony Bertuca, DOD Details Latest Defense Production Act Move to Increase N95 Mask Supply,
INSIDE DEF. (Apr. 21, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-details-latest-defenseproduction-act-move-increase-n95-mask-supply (describing PPE production contracts with 3M, O&M
Halyward, and Honeywell with expected production by June, within six months, and within ten months
respectively); Release, DOD Announces Defense Production Act Title 3 COVID-19 PPE Project, U.S.
DEP’T DEF. (May 28, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2200654/dodannounces-defense-production-act-title-3-covid-19-ppe-project-22-million-in/ (describing a contract with
Hollingsworth & Vose expecting production by August); and Chris Newmarker, U.S. Defense Department
Using Defense Production Act to Boost N95 masks Supply, MASS DEVICE (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.massdevice.com/u-s-defense-department-using-defense-production-act-to-boost-n95-maskssupply/ (reporting a contract for mask decontamination services for various locations nationwide).
75
See USTR: Response to Coronavirus Crisis, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/march/ustr-response-coronaviruscrisis.
76
For how Project Airbridge started and its challenges, see Memorandum from Carolyn B. Maloney, Chair
woman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to James E. Clybourn, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Cor
onavirus 4 (July 2, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/
Project%20Airbridge%20Memo%2007-02-20.pdf.
77
See Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, Chairwoman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, New
Document Shows Inadequate Distribution of Personal Protective Equipment and Critical Medical Supplies
to States (Apr. 8, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/new-document-shows-inadequatedistribution-of-personal-protective-equipment-and.
78
See Memorandum from Carolyn Maloney, supra note 76; Michael Biesecker, HHS: Federal Stocks of
Protective Equipment Nearly Depleted, AP (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://apnews.com/a464316e25560d393bd07a021b7e81ba (placing criticism of the stockpile in the context
of response to COVID). For a description of claims of political preferences between states, limited
transparency, and federal confiscation of supplies for states, see Adam Clark Estes, America’s Emergency
Medical Stockpile Is Almost Empty. Nobody Knows What Happens Next, VOX (Apr. 7, 2020, 11:20 AM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/3/21206170/us-emergency-stockpile-jared-kushner-almost-emptycoronavirus-medical-supplies-ventilators.
79
See Michael Biesecker, US ‘Wasted’ Months Before Preparing for Coronavirus Pandemic, AP (Apr. 5,
2020), https://apnews.com/090600c299a8cf07f5b44d92534856bc; Marisa Fernandez, Timeline: How the
U.S. Fell Behind on the Coronavirus, AXIOS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-timelinetrump-administration-testing-c0858c03-5679-410b-baa4-dba048956bbf.html.
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Security Act (CARES Act), which includes PPE provisions.80 Congress also used its
oversight powers to attain information about PPE shortages, the administration’s response,
and tariffs.81 For example, on March 21, 2020 chairs of six House committees requested a
briefing with HHS Secretary Alex Azar. After summarizing “widespread shortages,” they
asked about plans to “acquire and distribute” PPE, how the HHS would use the DPA, and
how it would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).82 On April
6, 2020, the chairs of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee
on Finance asked the USITC for details on tariff rates for goods related to the COVID
response.83 They described “an urgent public health crisis on the scale that we have not
encountered in over a century” that was “severely exacerbated by disruptions and
deficiencies in supply” of needed equipment.84 Next, Senators Thomas R. Carper (D-DE)
and Pat Toomey (R-PA) requested that the USTR “immediately and broadly suspend 301
tariffs” on products needed to manufacture critical medical supplies.85 They explained that
there was “an extreme shortage” of “supplies needed to respond” to the pandemic,
including PPE.86 On another front, members of Congress proposed legislation to address
COVID’s racial disparities and improve PPE supplies in the United States.87
80

See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No: 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.) (Section 3102 requires that the strategic national stockpile include PPE;
Section 3101 requires the HHS and National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on
the security of the United States medical product supply chain; Section 3103 revises the liability protections
for use of NIOSH approved masks; Section 12003 requires the HHS to consider distributing PPE to prison
for inmates and staff; Section 20005 and 2009 focus on similar requirements for Veterans Administration
facilities.).
81
For example, House and Senate committees requested that the USITC investigate PPE supplies, see
USITC, USITC To Investigate Industry and Supply Chain Conditions Affecting COVID-19 Industry Sectors
and Products, New Release 20-097, Inv. No. 332, -580, (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2020/er0821ll1634.htm.
82
Letter from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Ranking Member Jim
Jordan, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, and Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform to Alex
M. Azar II, U. S. Sec. of Health and Hum. Servs, and Robert Kadlee, Assistant Sec. for Preparedness and
Response, Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. (Mar. 21, 2020),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-0321.CBM%20SFL%20JR%20Rouda%20GEC%20to%20HHS%20re%20PPE%20%281%29.pdf.
83
See Letter from Richard E. Neal, Chairman, Comm. on Ways and Means, & Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman, Comm. on Fin., to David Johanson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/imports_covid_19_request_letter.pdf.
84
See id.
85
See Letter from Thomas R. Carper, U.S. Senator, & Pat Toomey, U.S. Senator, to Robert E. Lighthizer,
U.S. Trade Rep. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.carper.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d/e/de9a8045-c5f94903-861a-53b0176de96d/A69A0D7987C83D56CAFBDE3C25DC6711.2020.04.17---letter-to-ustr-reemergency-tariff-suspensions-for-medical-supply-chain---final.pdf.
86
See id.
87
The COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Disparities Task Force Act would require data-driven
recommendations to allocate crucial resources, including PPE, in communities with racial disparities. See
Press Release, Durbin: If We Don't Address Racial Health Care Disparities, Shame On Us, DICK DURBIN
U.S. SENATOR ILL. (May 5, 2020), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-if-wedont-address-racial-health-care-disparities-shame-on-us. The Equitable Data Collection and Disclosure on
COVID-19 Act would require the CDC to post online data regarding “testing, treatment, and fatalities,
disaggregated by race, ethnicity, sex, age, socioeconomic status, disability status, county, and other
demographic information.” Id.; see also NCPA Staff, Senators Toomey and Hassan coordinate to make
PPE more accessible, NORTHCENTRALPA.COM (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.northcentralpa.com/life/covid-
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Congress also heard from federal agents who reported on these shortages or tried to
spur faster responses to COVID. On May 26, 2020, Christi A. Grimm testified before the
House Oversight Committee.88 She served as the principle investigator for the mentioned
HHS report.89 The Trump administration replaced Grimm at the HHS, allegedly because
the report’s conclusions drew negative attention to the administration’s inaction.90 This
came after former director of the United States Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority, Rick Bright, explained that the administration failed to take
“critical steps” in January and February 2020.91 He described that he was removed because
he disagreed with administration positions.
In sum, PPE was in short supply as a coronavirus pandemic initially hit the United
States during the first half of 2020. Imposed since 2018, tariffs not only increased prices
for these desperately needed products, but they resulted in decreased PPE imports. Despite
knowing about COVID’s pandemic risks since January, the federal government did too
little far too late to respond to the PPE crisis. It did not eliminate PPE or medical equipment
from Section 301 tariffs. Instead, the administration preferred to stay the course with the
posture that levies are needed during a trade war.
II.

THE UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE WAR RESULTS IN SECTION 301 TARIFFS.

The United States imposed additional tariffs on PPE pursuant to Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act), intended to combat unfair trade practices by foreign
states.92 Section 301 is one of many measures that are part of a trade war with China. One
objective of this trade war is to change Chinese industrial policies, implicating foreign and
economic relations between the two countries. Specific to trade, this conflict involves
thousands of goods subject to Section 301 levies; separate American tariffs on steel
(Section 232) and solar panels and washing machines (Section 201); and tariff retaliations
from China.93 Before the Trump administration initiated the China case in 2017, the last
Section 301 investigation was in 2013.94 To contextualize PPE shortages, this part of the
Article describes basic elements of Section 301 and the China Case. This analysis of
19_updates/senators-toomey-and-hassan-coordinate-to-make-ppe-more-accessible/article_c9843b5c-d9d111ea-9e1b-03003d3e876a.html (describing S.4497 Stop PPE Taxes Act of 2020 and S.4501 Strategic
Global Supply Chains Act of 2020).
88
See Dan Diamond, HHS Watchdog Vows Independence Amid Trump Actions, POLITICO (May 26, 2020,
2:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/26/hhs-watchdog-vows-independence-amid-trumpactions-282249.
89
See CHRISTI A. GRIMM, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-2000400, HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL
PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020, at 3 (2020), https://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf.
90
See Peter Baker, Trump Moves to Replace Watchdog Who Identified Critical Medical Shortages, N.Y.
TIMES (May 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/us/politics/trump-health-departmentwatchdog.html?referringSource=articleShare.
91
See Marisa Fernandez, Ousted Vaccine Chief: I was Told My Pandemic Warnings Were “Causing a
Commotion,” AXIOS (May 14, 2020), https://www.axios.com/rick-bright-testimony-coronavirus-responsed1362f5e-9033-481b-afb7-5e1a716f52bc.html.
92
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)-(c).
93
For a description of these tariff actions, see BROCK R. WILLIAMS & KEIGH E. HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45949, U.S.-CHINA TARIFF ACTIONS BY THE NUMBERS (2019).
94
See SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11346, supra note 25. There have been 127 Section 301
cases since 1974. See id.
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Section 301 illustrates how executive action can prioritize tariffs. The PPE crisis is one
socioeconomic impact resulting from these executive choices.95 As described below, the
PPE crisis adds to racial disparity in the COVID response.
“Section 301” refers to a set of American trade measures in sections 301 to 310 of
the Trade Act.96 Relevant to the PPE crisis, the Section 301 China Case developed in three
stages. In chronological order, the USTR: (1) investigated foreign conduct that hurt
American commerce, (2) imposed retaliatory sanctions to remedy this, and (3) decided
which particular goods, if any, were excluded from these sanctions. PPE imports became
part of the second and third stages.
For the first stage, the USTR investigates possible trade harms. It examines if the
foreign nation violates a trade agreement, pursues “unjustifiable” action that “burdens or
restricts” American commerce, or engages in “unreasonable or discriminatory” action that
“burdens or restricts” American commerce.97 The USTR conducts the investigation and
recommends sanctions or not, in consultation with an intra-agency committee and the
private sector. 98 It consults with the foreign country before starting the investigation.99
Referred to as the “determination,” the USTR makes recommendations based on the
investigation.100As described below, this investigation started the China Case, which is
currently in the retaliation stage.
Initiated on August 24, 2017, the investigation into China regards “Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation.”101 The USTR issued its investigation
report on March 22, 2018 with four general findings.102 First it found that China forces
technology transfers with government mechanisms including administrative procedures,
joint venture requirements, and others. Additionally, its licensing policies deprive
American companies from setting market-based terms in technology transactions. Next,
China directs investments in American companies to control strategic assets, such as for
the Made in China 2020 initiative. Lastly, China supports the cyber theft of trade secrets
and IP. Highlighting economic harms in technology and IP, these findings are the reason
for American retaliation in the China Case.
In a second stage called retaliation, Section 301 provides for trade sanctions,
including various measures that the USTR can choose from, one of which is tariffs.103 The
95

Domestic law typically addresses the economic dislocations and social consequences of trade policies.
Trade policies usually focus on the international arena, such as reaching or complying with trade
agreements or treatment for inbound foreign imports, but domestic law responds to its effects, see c.f.
Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution and the Imperial Presidency, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 16 (2018);
Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 2 (2019).
96
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
97
“Unreasonable” is defined as “unfair and “inequitable” and “not necessarily in violation of, or
inconsistent with” international obligations. 19 U.S.C. §2411(d)(3)(A). “Unjustifiable” is defined as in
violation of, or inconsistent with these obligations. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4)(A). Discriminatory actions
include the denial of national or most-favored- nation treatment. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5).
98
See 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
99
See 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1).
100
See 19 U.S.C. § 2414.
101
It was initiated on August 18, 2017. See Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,213
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FRN%20China301.pdf.
102
See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, supra note 26.
103
Other measures include suspending trade concessions and imposing import restrictions. See 19 U.S.C. §
2411(b)-(c).
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United States applies these sanctions in order to compel a change in foreign practices with
the objective that added economic costs of exporting to the United States will motivate a
change. During this stage, the USTR designates a list of goods that will be subject to
additional tariffs. The USTR issues a list proposal along with a Notice-and-Comment
announcement in the Federal Register.104 It requests comments on the potential economic
harm caused by additional tariffs.105 Based on public hearings and statements received in
the hearing or in response to the Notice-and-Comment, the USTR, in consultation with
other agencies, determines what goods warrant additional tariffs and their applicable tariff
rate.
These executive choices result in predictable negative socioeconomic impacts
because additional tariffs increase the price paid for products in the United States. The PPE
industry predicted the potential negative consequences. For instance, during this stage in
the China Case, distributors of PPE and medical products asked the USTR to remove their
products from the tariff list.106 In a public hearing, they explained that PPE is a “critical
component of our nation's response to public health emergencies, such as Ebola.”107 When
the USTR decided to keep these products on the tariff list, it effectively prioritized tariffs.
As the China Case entered the retaliation stage, the United States and China both
publicly threatened and proceeded with multiple escalating tariff rounds. On March 22,
2018, President Trump authorized additional tariffs for imports from China.108 Consistent
with the President’s prior comments, the USTR predicted that imports from China would
have a 25% tariff rate.109 The USTR deployed retaliatory tariffs in four rounds. The first
two rounds applied the 25% rate on July 6 and August 23 of 2018, for an estimated $34
billion and $16 billion in imports respectively.110 On June 15, 2019, a third round imposed
this rate to an additional $200 billion in imports.111 Later that year, a fourth round was
divided into two lists, 4A and 4B. The USTR deployed List 4A on September 1, 2019, with
a 15% tariff rate for $126 billion in imports.112 Then, announced on January 15, 2020 in a
“Phase One Agreement,” the United States and China agreed to stop new rounds of

104

See, e.g., Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of
Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 Fed. Reg. 14,906 (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FRN301.pdf.
105
This includes whether increased duties on a specific product help eliminate unfair economic practices
and cause “disproportionate economic harm” to American interests. See Notice of Action, 83 Fed. Reg.
14,906, 14,908.
106
See Section 301 Tariffs Public Hearing: Hearing Before the U.S. Trade Rep. 301 Comm., at 386 (Aug.
20, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/0820USTR.pdf (statement from
Matt Rowan, President, Health Indus. Distribs. Ass’n) [hereinafter Rowan Testimony].
107
See id.
108
See Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws, Policies,
Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg,
13,099 (Mar. 22, 2018).
109
These determinations are pursuant to sections 301(b), 301(c), and 304(a), codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2411(b), 2411(c), 2414(a). See Notice of Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 14,906.
110
See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS: SECTION 301
AND CHINA 1 (2019).
111
The prior September, a 10% tariff rate had been imposed on these goods. See id.
112
See WILLIAMS & HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN10943, supra note 9, at 4.
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tariffs.113 This agreement, implemented on February 14, 2020, suspended List 4B.114 It kept
the List 4A tariff rate at 7.5% and kept the rates for the three prior rounds. 115 By then,
China was deep into fighting the COVID epidemic, while virus spread in the United States
was just becoming apparent. As of November 2020, this is where retaliation in the China
Case remains.
In the third stage of a Section 301 case, goods may be excluded from the additional
tariff charges. Specifically, private parties request that the USTR remove a particular goods
classification from the tariff list, with the USTR then approving or denying these. For this,
private parties submit comments and provide testimony in response to the USTR’s Noticeand-Comment requesting information on the product’s supply.116 Initially, in June 2018,
long before COVID, the USTR developed an exclusion process. 117 This was the first time
that the USTR established a process to request exclusions for 301 tariffs.118
In 2019, noting that their products would likely be subject to a 25% duty, producers
of PPE and medical supplies again requested that the USTR remove their goods from the
tariff list.119 This time the producers asked to be excluded from the tariff lists.120 They
requested this after the USTR announced the tariff lists and included products from these
producers.121 The producers predicted what eventually occurred in 2020, i.e. the PPE
crisis.122 Medical supplies and PPE makers explained that Section 301 tariffs would
immediately increase costs for “hospitals, surgery centers, long-term care facilities,
individual consumers, and government programs” with no real alternative source for the
products than China.123 Specific to a pandemic, they detailed compromised supply chains,
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See Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of The People’s Republic of China Text, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-tradeagreement/text.
114
See id.
115
See id.
116
The USTR requests information regarding the product and its availability from non-Chinese sources,
attempts to procure it from the United States and other countries, reviews whether the imposition of Section
301 tariffs causes severe economic harm to American interests, and determines the product’s importance to
the Made in China 2025 program, see for example, Procedures To Consider Requests for Exclusion, 83
Fed. Reg. 32,181 (July 11, 2018). In the past, such exclusions were based on the USTR finding that in
extraordinary cases the 301 action would cause an “adverse impact” on United States economy
“substantially out of proportion to benefits” of the action, see 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B) (iv), or “would
cause serious harm to the national security,” see 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(2)(B)(iv-v).
117
See, e.g., Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of
Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,710 (June 20, 2018).
118
See ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11582, SECTION 301: TARIFF EXCLUSIONS ON
U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA (2020).
119
See Section 301 Tariffs Public Hearing: Hearing Before the U.S. Trade Rep. 301 Comm., at 191-92
(June 20,
2019) (testimony of Lara Simmons, Medline Indus., Inc.), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/30
1Investigations/Section_301_Hearing_Transcript_on_Proposed_Tariffs_Day_4.pdf [hereinafter Simmons
Testimony]; see id. at 197-98 (testimony of Linda O’Neill, Health Indus. Distribs. Ass’n) [hereinafter
O’Neill Testimony].
120
Simmons Testimony, supra note 119; O’Neill Testimony, supra note 119.
121
See id.
122
See id. at 196, 201.
123
See id. at 191-92.
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which would put public health preparedness at risk.124 They pointed to recent viral
epidemics, such as Ebola and H1NI, as proof of when demand for PPE increases
fivefold.125 In these circumstances, PPE was “critical” to any response.126 This was the
second attempt by PPE producers and distributors to avoid additional tariffs.
Some PPE products did have their exclusion requests approved. For instance, face
masks received a partial exclusion from the 7.5% tariff rate, announced on March 17, 2020.
127
The USTR did not announce many PPE exclusions, such as for goggles, medical gloves,
textile gloves, or disposable hospital apparel, until after the COVID outbreak in the United
States.128 These approved exclusions applied retroactively based on when the Section 301
tariff rate was imposed and expired on August 7 or September 1, 2020.129
However, beginning in 2018, the USTR did not approve many PPE exclusions.130
The following protective items were subject to the 25% tariff rate without any exclusion:
headgear, plastic aprons, protective aprons, garments made of rubber, and textiles
reinforced with rubber.131 These products were similarly subject to the 7.5% tariff rate:
surgical gowns, gloves, hair nets, patient gowns, hospital gowns, and scrubs.132 For these
products, PPE importers would have to pay these added taxes when their goods entered the
United States.133 Customs officials would start imposing these charges depending on when
they were announced, as part of Section 301 tariff round 1, 2, 3 or 4A.134 By not approving
these exclusions for PPE, the USTR reaffirmed its prioritization of tariffs over public health
readiness.
After COVID became an American emergency, the USTR reacted but did not shift
its position that PPE goods would be part of a Section 301 retaliation.135 It began
considering items needed for the pandemic response.136 This came as the USTR announced
a supplemental comment request on March 20, 2020.137 The USTR invited comments
124

See id. at 196, 201.
See O’Neill Testimony, supra note 119.
126
See id.
127
This included N95 respirators, surgical masks, disposable masks, shoe covers, and textile face masks
with plastic face shields. This exclusion was retroactively applied to include additional duties paid since
September 1, 2019. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 62, at “Table 3: Products listed in table 1
that are excluded from Section 301 duties” Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 10-digit code:
6307.90.9889.
128
See id., at HTS 10-digit code: 9004.90.0000, 3926.20.9050, 4015.19.0510, 4015.19.0550, 6116.10.6500,
6210.10.5000
129
See id.
130
See Josh Zumbrun & Anthony DeBarros, U.S. Grants Tariff Exemptions for More Medical-Goods from
China, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-grants-tariff-exemptionsfor-more-medical-goods-from-china-11584125840.
131
See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 62, at HTS 10-digit codes: 3926.20.9010, 4015.19.1010,
4015.90.0050, 6505.00.9089.
132
See id. at HTS 10-digit codes: 6113.00.1012, 6210.50.5555, 6211.43.1091, 6211.42.1081, 6216.00.5420,
6505.00.0100, 6505.00.9089.
133
See Bown, supra note 10.
134
See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS: SECTION 301
AND CHINA 1 (2019).
135
See Ana Swanson, Trump Trade Official Defends China Deal and Criticizes the W.T.O., N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/business/economy/us-trade-china-tariffs.html
(reporting an administration preference for PPE tariffs five months after the virus entered the country).
136
See USTR: Response to Coronavirus Crisis, supra note 75.
137
See id.
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regarding “tariff actions and relevant responses to the coronavirus.”138 Earlier that month,
it started approving exclusions for PPE and medical products,139 without announcing them
as COVID related.140
The USTR’s March 20 request focused on “medical-care products needed to address
the COVID-19 outbreak” and possible “modifications to remove duties from additional
medical-care products.”141 It asked for a particular explanation of “how [each particular]
product relates to the response.”142 This explanation could include whether the item is
directly used to treat the virus, limit the outbreak, or produce needed “medical-care
products.”143 For three months after this USTR announcement, it was unclear how the
USTR would use these pandemic related comments.144 By July 2020, the USTR received
over 600 comments regarding COVID-related products.145 On its webpage, it stated that it
was “not planning to hold hearings” for these products and how Section 301 tariffs impact
them.146 It did request public comments on whether exclusions from these duties should be
extended beyond their September 1, 2020 deadline.147 This means that the USTR
considered extending general exclusions from additional tariffs. USTR consideration is not
specific to COVID-related products. It is unlikely that that PPE products will receive a
blanket exclusion from Section 301 tariffs. Accordingly, PPE products may only receive
tariff relief after the USTR reviews and then approves an exclusion request for a particular
product classification.
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See id.
This included PPE such as examination gloves, single-use surgical drapes, single-used and medical
masks, and “certain other protective articles” and various medical equipment, medical parts, and sanitation
items. See Lars-Erik Hjelm, Suzanne Kane, Emily Fuller Opp & Andrew Schlossberg, USTR Requests
Comments on Section 301 Tariffs on COVID-19 Related Products, JD SUPRA (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ustr-requests-comments-on-section-301-44066/. It also included
patient bags, medical waste disposal bags. See Zumbrun & DeBarros, supra note 130.
140
For an initial description of this, see Bown, supra note 10. For these exclusions in March, see Notice of
Product Exclusions, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,970 (March 10, 2020) and 85 Fed. Reg. 15,244 (Mar. 17, 2020)
(applying exclusions for tariffs since Sept. 1, 2019 with exclusions expiring Sept. 1, 2020); Notice of
Product Exclusions, 85 Fed. Reg, 15,015 (Mar. 16, 2020) (applying exclusions for tariffs since September
24, 2018, and with exclusions expiring August 7, 2020).
141
See Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address COVID-19:
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation,
85 Fed. Reg. 16,987 (2020).
142
See id.
143
See id. The USTR began this separate request, since the public comment period window for exclusions
had closed before COVID. See Mark K. Neville, Jr., Trade in the Time of COVID-19: Make America
Healthy Again!, 31 J. INT’L TAX’N 30 (2020).
144
See SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., IF11582, supra note 118, at 2.
145
See Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address COVID-19,
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USTR-2020-0014 (last visited July 31, 2020).
146
See FAQS FOR REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE 301 ACTION TO
ADDRESS COVID-19: CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FAQs_on_Additional_Modifications_to_
Address_COVID-19.pdf (last updated June 26, 2020).
147
See Request for Comments Concerning the Extension of Particular Exclusions of Particular Exclusions
Granted Under the $300 Billion Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices
Related to Technology, Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,482 (2020).
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Exclusions provide minimal relief from the tax burdens felt by Americans from
Section 301 retaliation. In most cases these imports cost more to enter the United States,
and this cost is passed to domestic consumers.148 An exclusion requires a stakeholder to
affirmatively make a request. But most importantly, even after the slow process, the USTR
rarely approves such requests. For instance, through January 31, 2020, the USTR received
52,746 exclusion requests and only approved 13% of them, while denying 87% of them.149
In July, the USTR extended the exclusions for some—not all—goods that had been
previously approved.150 These determinations do not mention any COVID-related
products. In September, the USTR extended more exclusions until December 31, 2020, but
not for all of the ones initially approved.151 As 2020 ended, the USTR approved exclusions
for some medical-care products to address COVID–19, effective January 1, 2021 to March
31, 2021.152 These exclusions are primarily for medical equipment and products but include
some PPE. 153
In sum, tariffs on PPE are part of a larger Section 301 case, investigating and then
retaliating against technology transfers and IP policies and practices in China.154
Consequently, the administration has imposed tariff increases, up to 25%, for over a
thousand imported goods, including PPE.155 With Section 301, President Trump was able
to follow through with a campaign promise and apply tariffs to force changes in China.156
More importantly, Section 301 allows the executive branch to control when to deploy
additional tariffs, how long they are imposed, and at what tariff rate.
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See Smialek & Swanson, supra note 11.
These figures refer to approvals and denials as of October 25, 2020, see CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECTION
301: TARIFF EXCLUSIONS ON U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA, IF11582 (2020).
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See, e.g., Notice of Product Exclusion Extensions: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,267 (July 9, 2020)
(announcing extensions until Dec. 31, 2020); Notice of Product Exclusion, 84 Fed. Reg. 43,291 (July 12,
2020) (announcing exclusions applied retroactively); Request for Comments Concerning the Extension of
Particular Exclusions Expiring in October 2020 Granted Under the $34 Billion Action Pursuant to Section
301, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,777 (Aug. 3, 2020) (requesting comments regarding possible extensions for
exclusions expiring on Oct. 2, 2020).
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See, e.g., Notice of Product Exclusions Extensions, 85 Fed. Reg. 54616 (Sept. 2, 2020). See also David
Lawder, U.S. Extends some China Tariff exclusions only through year end, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020),
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See Notice of Product Exclusion Extensions and Additional Modifications: China’s Acts, Policies, and
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 85 Fed. Reg. 85,831 (Dec.
29, 2020).
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This includes aprons, gloves in Annex C and face shields, face masks, gloves, and shoe covers in Annex
D. See id.
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See supra Part II.
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See Bown, supra note 10; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra notes 61-62.
156
For examples of Trump discussing China during the 2016 president campaign, see Veronica
Stracqualursi, 10 Times Trump attacked China and its trade relations with the US, ABC NEWS (Nov. 9,
2017, 6:55AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/10-times-trump-attacked-china-trade-relations-us/story?id=46572567;
Nick Corasaniti, Alexander Burns & Binyamin Appelbaum, Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals
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SECTION 301 INSULATES CHOICES TO FAVOR TARIFFS OVER EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS.

The Trump administration employed additional taxes on imports from China with
statutory powers delegated by Congress in Section 301. Even though the Constitution
expressly provides that tariff powers belong to Congress,157 the executive branch may
impose these types of tariffs in response to various situations, with minimal or no checks
by Congress or the courts.158 An administration can apply these duties when it determines
that imports threaten national security (Section 232),159 when import quantities harm
domestic industry (Section 201),160 or when foreign states engage in unfair trade practices
(Section 301).161 This Article refers to these as “executive tariffs,” since the executive
branch determines when they are imposed, how this happens, and for how long. Executive
tariffs have an established place in American trade policies and the Trump administration
increased their use.162 This runs contrary to free trade liberalizations and Congressional
control of tariff policies generally.163 But importantly, executive tariffs create significant
economic burdens in the United States felt by consumers and importers. For instance, as
imports faced added custom levies PPE prices increased and supplies decreased. As
explained in Part IV, this has racial consequences for virus exposure and COVID
treatments. Black, Indigenous, and People of Color disproportionately catch COVID, die
from it, and makeup the majority of essential workers. Applied pursuant to Section 301,
tariffs decreased PPE supplies and increased their prices most needed by these patients and
workers.
This Part describes executive tariffs as one legal aspect of the trade war. It focuses
on how the power to impose executive tariffs: (a) effectively insulates executive actions
from governmental checks, (b) aggravates the COVID response by reducing available PPE,
and (c) can be reformed by requiring more of a role for Congress. With this delegated
power, the Trump administration prioritized tariffs on Chinese goods over preparedness
for American public health and healthcare systems.
A. Traditionally Presidents Freely Deploy Section 301.
The expanded use of executive tariffs raises important separation of powers
questions regarding how Congress and the executive branch devise and implement trade
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (stating Congress has the power “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts, and Excises” and “To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations”).
158
For a description of how these delegations started historically, see Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics
in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. REV. 285, 287 (1986).
159
See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
160
See Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
161
See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
162
Congress and the President do work together to craft trade policy. “Fast track” authority exemplifies this
when Congress approves executive-led trade negotiations for international agreements, such as recently
with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. For a description of this, see Trade Act of 1974 § 151,
19 U.S.C. § 2191.
163
See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020)
(illustrating how these tariffs function as security-based exceptions to international trade commitments and
proposing new delegation standards to offset these harms); Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade
and Separation of Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 583 (2019) (arguing for a rebalance of the constitutional
power over trade with Congress more active in multiple trade policy areas).
157
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policy. Kathleen Claussen explains that executive tariffs operate as security exceptions
delegated by Congress, allowing the Executive a way to employ tariffs to respond to
perceived threats.164 They can undo international trade commitments approved by
Congress, potentially veering far from their original statutory purpose.165 Timothy Meyer
and Ganesh Sitaraman point to Congress’s complex cession of trade powers to the
executive branch.166 This cession includes Section 301, as well as authority to fast track
trade negotiations, initiate and pursue trade wars, withdraw from international trade
treaties, and make international trade commitments.167 As these legal scholars explain,
tensions between the two branches over trade policy develop in many areas, not solely with
Section 301.
Seen as a constitutional allocation of government powers, Section 301 tariffs
function as a presidential action without input from Congress.168 The USTR must report or
consult with Congress in various instances, but not much more.169 The Trade Act delegates
management of Section 301 to the USTR, within the Executive Office of the President. 170
It states that the President may take action when the USTR makes its determination
regarding unfair foreign practices.171 Investigations are under USTR control. Directing the
USTR and responsible for the Section 301 process, the Trade Representative is a political
appointee, typically working closely with, if not directly following instructions from, the
White House.172 Civil servants conduct USTR tasks during the investigation, retaliation,
and exclusion stages.173 In this regard, any independent input during Section 301’s three
stages most likely hinges on the participation of government employees who are not
appointed by the President.174 Other agencies consult with the USTR throughout this, but
the USTR is the most important agency in these three stages and in reporting to
Congress.175
Section 301 powers are broadly delegated to the executive branch and more precisely
to the USTR. The USTR has the discretion to initiate an investigation and to pursue
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See id. at 1103.
See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1142.
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See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 588-89.
167
See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 588-89.
168
See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1103 (describing that the president is allowed “to act without any
supervision when he wishes to set higher tariffs”); Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 648-49
(explaining the president’s “significant discretion” for this tariff includes determining the trade remedy,
which products, from what country, and for how long).
169
This includes publication in the Federal Register if it does the following: decides whether to initiate an
investigation, see 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(3)-(4); (b)(1)(A); has reached a determination, see 19 U.S.C. §
2414(c); or modifies an action, see 19 U.S.C. § 2417(b). It also has to report to Congress, semi-annually,
regarding Section 301 actions taken with respect to investigations and their commercial effects. 19 U.S.C. §
2419(3)(C)(D). It is required to consult annually with Congress regarding investigations and trade
enforcement priorities and actions. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)-(b).
170
See Trade Act of 1974 §301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
171
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (requiring action regarding practices in violation of a trade agreement); 19
U.S.C. § 2411(b) (providing the USTR discretion to start action in cases of unreasonable or discriminatory
trade practices).
172
See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1128-29.
173
See id.
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See id.
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See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c)(2)(C); 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1)(B); 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(D).
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retaliation.176 Under the caption of “Discretionary Action,” the Trade Act specifically states
that the USTR takes action subject to the President’s “specific direction.”177 USTR actions
are similarly subject to “all other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the
President.”178 The USTR can act “within the power of the President” regarding trade in
goods or services or “any other area pertinent to relations with country.”179 With this, the
USTR may rely on other executive powers, including foreign relations.
This discretion is evident in the China Section 301 Case, specifically during the
exclusion stage. There is no clear requirement for exclusions in the Trade Act. This leaves
the process “solely at the USTR’s discretion” and unclear as to how it functions internally
in the USTR.180 With exclusions, American consumers, importers, retailers, and
manufacturers try desperately to escape executive tariffs. This stage provides the last
chance to avoid economic harms until the President ends the Section 301 case or a
negotiation with the foreign country is completed.
A series of procedural, reporting, and timing requirements guide how the USTR
advances Section 301 cases. The USTR has to report and consult with Congress in various
instances.181 It must announce in the Federal Register developments regarding the
investigation, its determination, and modification or termination of any action.182 Various
deadlines force the USTR to proceed or report on a case. 183 The USTR must consult with
other agencies and the private sector during the investigation and retaliation phases of
Section 301 cases.184 While these requirements do keep policy makers and stakeholders
informed and at times able to provide their perspective, it is difficult for other government
branches or agencies to stop or significantly change how cases progress.
Most likely, if the USTR follows the process laid out in the Trade Act and is closely
driven by Presidential direction, a case will not significantly change course. Kathleen
Claussen argues that executive tariffs’ statutory structure predisposes the executive branch
to employ them.185 Put simply, the President and the USTR heavily control the fate of
Section 301 tariffs, typically until they reach a resolution with the foreign state. Relevant
to PPE during the pandemic, tariff changes will only happen when the administration is
satisfied with IP and cyber theft developments in China, ends the investigation, removes
PPE from retaliation actions against China, or excludes individual PPE goods from the
tariffs.
Substantive checks on executive tariffs have been eliminated. For example, the
legislative veto originally constrained Section 301 actions. When enacted in 1974, the
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See 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (c).
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
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See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2).
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See id.
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See SCHWARZENBERG, supra note 118, at 1.
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See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412 (b)(2)(C), 2413(b)(2)(B), 2417(b), 2420.
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See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2414(a)(3)(B)(iii), 2412(a)(4), 2412(b)(1)(A), 2412(b)(2)(D) (investigation); 19 U.S.C.
§ 2414(c) (determination); 19 U.S.C. § 2417(b) (modification or termination of any action).
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These include twelve months to conduct an investigation, 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(B); 30 days to
implement retaliations such after a determination has been reached, 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a); four years for
retaliation, 19 U.S.C. § 2417(c)(1).
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See 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
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Trade Act permitted Congress to disapprove and stop specific Section 301 actions.186 This
constituted a legislative veto, an act that overrides a completed executive action.187 In 1983,
however, the Supreme Court found legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional in I.N.S. v.
Chadha.188 The Court’s ruling abolished the “most important Congressional restraint” for
delegations of trade power to the executive, relevant to Section 301 and other executive
tariffs.189 In the Trade Act, Congress contemplated the legislative veto as an important
constraint.
Traditionally, courts have not exercised meaningful checks on executive tariff
delegations, but recent litigation since the trade war hints at potential changes. Sections
301, 201, and 232 do not expressly provide for judicial review for executive tariffs.190 Court
review has usually been precluded, since the President has not been regarded as an agency,
which is needed for review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).191 The USTR
is technically within the Executive Office of the President and argued to not be an
agency.192 Similarly, courts have found that executive tariffs meet delegation requirements
needed to impose additional duties pursuant to congressional authorization.193 Recent
attempts to challenge the Court’s delegation findings have failed. In 2019, the United States
Court of International Trade found that Section 232 tariffs for steel were constitutional
delegations of Congress’s tariff powers.194
Legal doctrine may change with the trade war. The Court of International Trade’s
recent rulings and decisions point to judicial enforcement of the procedural requirements
for executive tariffs. In one case involving duties for steel products from Turkey, under
Section 232, the trial court found that retaliatory tariff designations must conform with
timelines in the statute.195 It described these requirements as constraints on executive
power. 196 In 2020, a later panel of the court upheld this order, stating that for tariffs,
presidents must strictly adhere to timeline restrictions.197 In another case regarding tariffs
on solar products pursuant to Section 201, the court focused on USTR determinations
during the exclusion process.198 This process is similar to the third stage of Section 301,
but here it is for Section 201 when the USTR responds to import quantities that harm
186

See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2043 (regarding trade actions for
countries not part of an investigation); Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade
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domestic industry. Importantly, the court found that the USTR is an agency for the
purposes of the APA, emphasizing how the USTR operates and how it presents itself.199 It
added that USTR exclusion choices did not conform with Notice-and-Comment
requirements and were likely arbitrary and capricious.200 Rulings since then agree.201
The Court of International Trade is expected to rule on a similar case, specifically
regarding Section 301 tariffs and the APA. In a complaint filed in September of 2020,
importers focus on procedural problems with tariff retaliations in the China Case. 202 They
argue that later tariff rounds, rounds three and four, are not related to the original purpose
of the Section 301 investigation of China’s IP and cyber theft practices. 203 They also
contend that these tariff rounds are untimely, since they came twelve months after the
USTR’s report on China’s unfair trade practices.204 Nearly three thousand importers have
made similar contentions before the court about the procedural illegalities with Section 301
tariff retaliations.205
B. Section 301 Aggravated the COVID Response.
Section 301 tariffs significantly impact public health readiness, with racial
consequences in coronavirus exposure and treatments. As the pandemic persists, Section
301 remains extremely relevant because China still dominates the PPE market, and the
trade war shows no sign of ending. Countless Americans need these goods as essential
workers, patients, first responders, or everyday shoppers. Early in 2020, Section 301 tariffs
made PPE more expensive and consequently diminished supplies. This aggravated the PPE
crisis. Shortages resulted in more virus contractions, hospitalizations, and deaths.
PPE is needed to stop COVID’s community spread. The UC Berkeley Labor Center
found that in California over 20,000 worker infections could have been avoided with proper
PPE.206 Recent studies since the pandemic identify reduced COVID contractions when PPE
is used.207 Thus, the executive choices to tax PPE imports aggravates COVID policies by
reducing the availability of PPE.
199

See id. at 1282.
See id. at 1288.
201
See, e.g., Transpacific Steel LLC, 2020 WL 3979838.
202
See Complaint, HTMX Indus. v. U.S., U.S. Court of Int’l Trade, Sept. 10, 2020, Court No. 20-00177,
https://www.lawbc.com/uploads/docs/HMTX_v_US__China_Section_301_List_3_and_4A_complaint.pdf.
203
See id. at 2.
204
See id.
205
See John Brew and Mert Arkan, HTMX et al. v. United States – An (Ongoing?) Opportunity for
Importers to Recover Section 301 Tariffs Paid on Section 301 List 3 (and 4A) Products, CROWELL
MORNING (Oct 8. 2020), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/The-Month-inInternational-Trade-September-2020#ITB07 (providing a list of plaintiffs). See also Mollie D. Sitkowski,
Latest Development in Court Case Challenging Validity of Section 301 Tariffs; Opportunity to Add
Challenge to List 4A to Complaints, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/latest-development-court-case-challenging-validity-section-301tariffs-opportunity.
206
William Dow, Kevin Lee & Laurel Lucia, Economic and Health Benefits of a PPE Stockpile, U. CAL.
BERKELEY LABOR CTR. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/economic-and-health-benefits-ofa-ppe-stockpile/.
207
One study reports daily COVID growth rates declining by .9% and 2% in American states where face
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Tariffs hurt public health readiness. The USTR deployed Section 301 for an entirely
different goal: to change IP and cyber theft practices in China. In policy terms, the Trump
administration weighed the impact of retaliatory tariffs for imports by Americans with the
goal of ending China’s unfair treatment of American businesses. In this calculation, PPE
imports are just one set of goods amongst thousands that became more expensive with
additional tariffs, starting in 2018.208 Section 301 is a part of a larger trade war with China,
with executive tariffs also imposed on steel, solar panels, and washing machines. All of
these trade measures are part of larger tensions with China. These tensions include public
friction over 5G and Huawei, Hong Kong, journalists in the two countries, COVID
responses, and multilateral tensions in the World Health Organization, South China Sea,
and World Trade Organization.209 In sum, executive choices to deploy retaliatory tariffs,
whether in Sections 301, 201, or 232, happened while the administration pursued other
foreign policy objectives.
The USTR in the investigation and retaliation stages of the China Case publicly and
methodologically contemplated economic pressure on China. Section 301 cases cause
harm to domestic American economic interests.210 Tariff duties are actually paid
domestically by Americans, and later these impacts, in the form of external economic
pressure, may force changes in China’s unfair commercial practices. 211 With Section 301,
taxes are charged and paid in the United States whereas changes to Chinese policies are
the eventual goal but are not certain. In the past, Section 301 cases succeeded when the
United States had more leverage over the foreign country.212 Past experiences with Section
301 cases suggest that without sufficient leverage the result can frustrate goals to open
foreign markets, unpredictability hurting American consumers, and creating negative
consequences to foreign policy, financial, and national security objectives.213 China is the
second largest economy in the world and by many measures a superpower, changing
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2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/world/asia/us-china-cold-war.html.
210
See Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perils of Economic Nationalism and a Proposed
Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115 (2019).
211
See Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding & David E. Weinstein, New China Tariffs Increase Costs to U.S.
Households, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (May 23, 2019),
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2019/05/new-china-tariffs-increase-costs-to-ushouseholds.html; Smialek & Swanson, supra note 11.
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leverage calculations.214 As such, the China Case appears to be more focused on rewriting
legal rules on trade to compete with China versus protecting domestic industries or helping
Americans who economically suffer from trade.215
In 2020 it became clear that the Trump administration did not take public health
warnings as seriously as needed when it failed to assess the blowback effects of its tariffs
on the global supply chain. Warnings specifically concerned PPE and medical supplies
from China because China is the largest producer of PPE. 216 Supply chains provide these
products worldwide as opposed to the goods manufactured domestically. Supply chains
quickly and economically produce and transport PPE.217 Overseas producers formulate
their manufacturing procedures for international demand.218 For American purchasers, this
results in PPE of high medical quality, with the overseas production having the required
American health regulation approvals.219 However, the supply chain system is not flexible.
It is not easy to source alternative suppliers for PPE. It takes years to find new producers
or to develop production capacities elsewhere. This is particularly true given China’s large
share of global PPE production, low labor costs, and manufacturing capabilities approved
by the FDA for the American market.220
With these commercial aspects, the USTR failed to recognize the foreseeable
negative impacts if PPE demand surged. Industry representatives gave their warnings in
2018 and 2019 during the retaliation and exclusion stages of the China Case.221 Looking
back, Section 301 tariffs could have been imposed on thousands of imports with PPE not
included. The public health and emergency significance of PPE, plus tariff charges of up
to 25%, should have been weighed against the economic pressure directed at China.
Pandemics are not a surprise. Recent presidencies have had to quickly address virus
outbreaks, like MERs, H1N1, Ebola, and others.222 Most likely, Trump administration
officials prioritized putting economic pressure on China, or they did not recognize the
impact that tariffs would have on American supplies.
Here, the executive branch did not use its discretionary powers to avoid additional
tariffs on PPE. It has two ways to avoid these tariffs. The USTR did not eliminate PPE
from Section 301 tariffs in 2018 or 2019, nor did the President invoke emergency powers
to allow duty-free imports in 2020. As described, the USTR enjoys wide delegations of
discretionary influence over the retaliation and exclusion stages.223 As early as 2018, it
See Yen Nee Lee, Here are 4 Charts that Show China’s Rise as a Global Economic Power, CNBC
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could have taken PPE off the tariff list for Section 301 retaliation. The USTR and President
did not use their legal powers to offset the blowback from imposing executive tariffs on
PPE.
Moreover, the administration did not use its emergency power to make imports dutyfree. Section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930 specifically allows the President to eliminate
import tariffs for designated goods.224 In April 2020, President Trump did invoke Section
318 to change custom charges for imports. But, this only allowed importers to postpone
(not suspend) tariff payments, and it explicitly excluded Section 301 duties.225
The executive similarly did not take the public health impacts of PPE supplies as
seriously as needed when it planned Section 301 retaliations and exclusions in 2018 and
2019. Multiple PPE and medical supply producers submitted comments and testified to the
need for these goods in a public health emergency or epidemic.226 Speaking directly to
potential inclusion on the tariffs list and then for exclusion requests, they described the
experience of PPE demand and price surges during recent H1N1 and Ebola epidemics.227
While the USTR is primarily focused on trade enforcement and economic
consequences for Americans, the executive branch has multiple agencies and mandates to
monitor and prepare for situations like COVID.228 These agencies contribute to the Section
301 intra-agency consultations.229 The Trump administration was not prepared for this kind
of emergency. These complaints encompass far more than PPE.230 These mishaps from the
White House add to the mentioned delays in responding to COVID warnings from leading
aides and cabinet members.231
C. Section 301 Can Be Reformed.
PPE and medical supplies will remain of extreme significance, whether this
pandemic persists, new ones arise, or trade tensions with China continue. Lawmakers can
See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (providing for the President to authorize the “importation free of duty” for
“medical, surgical, and other supplies for use in emergency relief work”).
225
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226
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reform Section 301 to avoid crises similar to the PPE crisis experienced in early 2020.232
The administration, Congress, and courts have the means to help ensure supply shortages
are not exacerbated during trade enforcement measures.
The executive has two ways to offset the harms of additional tariffs deployed in a
Section 301 case: emergency powers under Section 318 and exclusions from these tariffs.
One way the executive can combat the economic harms is to implement Section 318
emergency powers eliminating the additional tariffs enacted pursuant to Section 301. The
President can pursue Section 301 cases and then in conjunction with this it can invoke
emergency Section 318 powers when needed. Emergency scenarios can be identified
before imports are taxed. Already, the USTR complies with various Notice-and-Comment
requirements while preparing the tariff list and during the exclusion process.233 At these
stages, the USTR could identify the emergency significance of any goods. Section 318
allows for importing goods duty-free after declaring an emergency. It specifically lists
“food, clothing, and medical, surgical, and other supplies.”234 When an emergency like
COVID develops, or a natural disaster or war, the President can invoke these Section 318
powers to eliminate tariffs on PPE. These measures are distinct from requests to have
particular items not included in list for additional tariffs.
Another way is for the USTR to use its discretion to suspend a good from being
included on the tariff list.235 Part II of this Article described these exclusions in the China
Case generally and for PPE more specifically. These two options, Section 318 and
exclusions, permit the executive branch to retain control of a Section 301 case while
offsetting the harms of goods being imported with added taxes.
However, these executive options pose two complications. First, for the USTR to
invoke emergency powers or modify the tariff list at its own discretion, it would require an
administration politically invested in the trade enforcement action to, on its own accord,
decide to pullback or to limit retaliatory tariffs. These levies are part of a larger Section
301 case. It is unlikely the Trump administration would have done this given the
importance it placed on the trade war. Second, any of these reliefs, with Section 318 or
with exclusion from the Section 301 tariff list, would not help supply shortages until after
goods are imported. As such, relief comes later, perhaps too late for emergency help. PPE
imports from China, weeks if not months away, exemplify these problems with government
action having a delayed impact.
Aside from these examples of executive action, Congress and the courts can help
avoid these delays and shortages in the future. Congress can reform parts of Section 301.
Since the China Case, members of Congress proposed bills to have the USTR provide more
disclosures to Congress about Section 301 actions.236 With new legislation, Congress can
232
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require the USTR to provide more information on the tariff list and the exclusion process.
The China Case has illuminated the lack of clarity involving the procedures for determining
what products will be subject to additional tariffs, what will be the tariff rate applied to
these products, and when these levies are applied. Similarly, the China Case has shown a
lack of clarity in the exclusions process, regarding how the USTR receives these requests
and reviews them.237
Another legislative option is for Congress to limit certain economic sectors from
retaliation measures in Section 301 cases. National security tariffs, also implemented by
the USTR, have such a provision limiting retaliation for petroleum in Section 232(f).238 A
similar provision could permit the USTR to make its substantive Section 301
determinations in stage one, as it does now, but in stage two or three any inclusion of
medical supplies or PPE would require Congressional approval. The President and the
USTR would be free to conduct the investigation, but tariff powers delegated by Congress
would be reserved for sensitive economic sectors.
Alternatively, Congress could designate another agency such as the USITC, which
is more independent than the USTR,239 to approve the tariff retaliation list generally or to
approve the USTR’s inclusion of products with emergency significance. While these
reforms to Section 301 would not secure PPE or medical equipment supplies, much less
limit health inequities, they would allow Congress members the opportunity to ask about
the economic burden of tariffs. If appropriately legislated, Congress could stop or delay
additional tariffs for certain goods.
Courts could step in once Section 301 cases are filed to enforce procedural limits on
USTR actions. The Court of International Trade’s recent rulings on Section 232 and 201
tariffs point to these potential procedural limitations. Section 232 and 201 have similar
delegations, structured as executive tariff actions after an agency conducts an investigation
and makes its determination. So far, recent rulings on these statutes found that the USTR
is an agency for APA jurisdictional purposes, the USTR and the President must comply
with procedures and timeline requirements, and Notice-and-Comment procedures limit
how the USTR makes its exclusion determinations.240 While these are not specific to
Section 301, they do provide insight into how courts may review the economic harms felt
domestically from executive tariffs. They also suggest how courts can begin to look at how
the USTR prioritizes its determination in the retaliation and exclusion stages of Section
301.
In sum, Section 301 tariffs are one of many statutory trade enforcement measures
delegated to the executive branch. With discretion to implement, administer, and decide
when to end these tariffs, Section 301 insulates presidents from significant checks from
Congress and the courts. This level of discretion protects executive choices intended to end
unfair trade practices hurting American commerce overseas. It similarly allows the
executive branch to designate how domestic businesses and consumers feel the burden of
additional tariffs. The PPE crisis, experienced in 2020, is one economic example of such a
burden. As described below, this has racial consequences by limiting PPE needed for
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communities who are disproportionately exposed to, infected by, and dying because of the
coronavirus.
IV.

PPE SCARCITY ADDS TO COVID’S RACIAL DISPARITIES.

PPE scarcity exemplifies how trade policies can have negative socioeconomic
effects. PPE supply chains function as intended, relying on Chinese production, when
goods are imported without added duties. This changed significantly with Section 301
retaliation, the consequential rise in PPE prices, and demand spikes because of COVID.
Because of this, a PPE buyer, whether a hospital system or an essential worker, faced
uncertainty in finding crucial items. In commercial terms, this decreased the supply of
goods needed in a public health emergency. Limited access to PPE prevented important
protections that would help stop virus spread, enabling individuals to work and support
themselves and their families.
PPE scarcity and its detrimental consequences disproportionately impact minority
communities. Public health and worker advocates explain that PPE is essential for minority
populations to fight COVID.241 This Part describes the impact that disruptions in PPE
supplies had on minority communities, provides definitions and a framework, describes
data regarding populations of color and the pandemic, and suggests how PPE scarcity adds
to COVID’s racial disparity. This Part also tries to motivate further inquiry. It prompts
questions as to the relationship between PPE costs and availability, and the resulting
socioeconomic consequences. The most important consequence of a disruption in PPE
supplies is a limited capacity to avoid virus contraction.
The pandemic shines light on “health disparities,” differences closely associated with
social, economic, and environmental disadvantages, or some combination of all three.242
These inequalities impact groups with characteristics linked to discrimination such as race,
gender, socioeconomic status, and immigration. This Article uses the terms “racial
disparity” or “racial consequences” to show how COVID disproportionately impacts
minority populations. Racial disparities and racial consequences are examples of health
disparities or health inequities.243 Racism and discrimination are structural and
institutional, with organizations or systems continuing race-based exclusions, without
needing any individual actor to discriminate.244 Specific intent to discriminate is not
needed, either when administering health services or when the USTR imposes executive
tariffs on PPE. From a similar perspective, Philip Blumenshine provides a framework to
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examine how pandemics impact these communities. The framework identifies three fronts:
virus exposure, susceptibility to the virus, and treatment for the virus.245
COVID’s racial disparities stand out clearly in the quantitative data on virus deaths
and contractions amongst African American, Latino, and other groups.246 These figures are
continually collected and examined as the pandemic develops with new surges since June
2020.247 The New York Times reports African American and Latino persons are three times
more likely to be infected and are nearly twice as likely to die compared to white
populations.248 These conclusions are based on nationwide CDC records from January until
the end of May of 2020.249 This time period corresponds to the focus of this Article’s
analysis of Section 301 tariffs and PPE shortages.
Multiple sources offer similar assessments, looking at different records and more
demographic groups. The COVID Racial Data Tracker explains that the virus “aff[ects]
Blacks, Indigenous, Latinx, and other people of color the most,” and offers figures updated
regularly and organized by deaths or positive cases, demographic group, and state or
territory.250 The APM Research Lab reports that compared to whites, the age-adjusted
mortality rate for African Americans is 3.8 times as high, followed by 3.2 times as high for
Indigenous persons, 2.6 for Pacific Islanders, 2.5 for Latinos, and 1.5 for Asians.251
Academic research examining COVID medical treatments in the early months of 2020
reaches conclusions consistent with these figures.252
These various sources, medical and quantitative, show that populations of color
disproportionately experience the contraction of COVID, as well as the illnesses,
hospitalizations, and deaths associated with it.253 Simultaneous to a PPE crisis, this begins
to illustrate the significance of protective equipment. In socioeconomic terms, these studies
indicate when PPE was most needed and when market disruptions had their most
245
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significant negative impact. The likely public health consequences were that a
disproportionate amount of minority groups had less protections from the virus. In sum,
these studies show COVID’s ultimate disparity and suggest when PPE was most needed.254
A picture can be drawn of how COVID affects populations of color and when PPE
could help. Pandemics impact these communities on three fronts: exposure to the virus,
susceptibility to the virus, and in treating virus-related illness.255 Ruqaiijah Yearby and
Seema Mohapatra apply this framework to COVID.256 Specifically, for coronavirus,
exposure relates to employment and housing, susceptibility involves pre-existing health
conditions, and treatment refers to limited access to medical care. 257 Guided by these
findings, Yearby and Mohapatra identify COVID’s racial disparities in the CARES Act
and employment, housing, and health care laws.258 This Article similarly looks at these
fronts to identify how PPE shortages arguably add to COVID’s disproportionate impacts.
Minority groups make up a disproportionate number of essential workers.259
Populations of color need PPE to avoid virus exposure while working in essential and
frontline jobs.260 With this equipment, workers can prevent virus contraction and further
infection of others. The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) found that over
four-in-ten frontline workers are African American, Hispanic, Asian-American/Pacific
Islander or non-white.261 CEPR describes a series of demographic findings for workers in
frontline industries nationwide.262 These industries are grocery, convenience, and drug
stores; public transit; trucking, warehouse, and postal service; building cleaning services;
health care; and childcare and social services.263 Hispanics are especially overrepresented
in building cleaning, and African Americans are most overrepresented in childcare and
social services.264 Workers of color are particularly overrepresented in specific occupations
in transit, cleaning, health care, childcare, and social services industries.265 Immigrants are
overrepresented in cleaning services and various frontline industries.266 The Economic
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Policy Institute finds similar overrepresentations for people of color in food and agriculture
industries and in industrial, commercial, and residential facilities and services.267
Specifically, non-white women are overrepresented in frontline industries. The
Center for American Progress explains that many of the jobs where women of color most
commonly work are in essential industries. For example, women of color often work as
nursing assistants, home health aides, and childcare workers.268 They also make up major
parts of specific occupations such as cashiers, registered nurses, personal care aides, maids,
and housekeeping cleaners.269 Another study finds that women make up the majority of
frontline workers, such as 76.8% of health care workers, 85.2% childcare and social
services workers, and the majority in 24 other frontline occupations.270
These studies begin to suggest how men and women may contract COVID while
working in these jobs where PPE is most needed. The UC Berkeley Labor Center found
that in California over 20,000 worker infections could have been avoided with proper
PPE.271 Recently, medical researchers found that frontline health care workers had at least
a threefold increased risk of COVID infection.272 This study added that “Black, Asian, and
minority ethnic” workers are at “especially high risk” of infection with “at least a fivefold
increased risk.”273 Specific to equipment shortages, it concluded that both the availability
of and the quality of PPE reduce the risk of COVID, and reusing PPE or inadequate PPE
might confer “comparably increased risk.”274
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News stories describe workers in grocery stores,275 meat processing plants,276 health
care,277 and agriculture278 catching the virus and dying. Labor and occupational analysis
shows that health care workers have the greatest risk of virus exposure, while personal care
and home health aides are quite vulnerable since they work with people most susceptible
to the coronavirus.279 State-level analysis of confirmed COVID cases reports this risk for
health care and social assistance workers.280 In some occupations, a large majority of health
care workers are exposed to disease or infection at least once per week.281 For these
workers, over 90% are exposed at least once per month.282 Over half of childcare workers,
nannies, and personal care aides are similarly exposed.283 Labor studies show African
American workers are “more likely to be essential and more likely to die.”284 Given these
working conditions, it is no surprise that healthcare, food, nursing home, and sanitation
workers have gone on strike or threatened to do so, calling for more PPE.285
Moreover, populations of color are disproportionately susceptible to the virus due to
pre-existing medical conditions and comorbidities. Health studies of African American
COVID patients report higher diagnoses of diabetes, hypertension, obesity, chronic kidney
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disease, heart disease and cerebrovascular disease.286 These underlying conditions
contribute to minority groups’ higher susceptibility to the virus and higher rates of
mortality.287 Public concern about the virus reflects these consequences. The Pew Research
Center reports that one in four African American adults said that they personally know
someone who has been hospitalized or died from COVID, roughly double the share
reported by Hispanic or white adults.288 Hispanic adults express greater concern about
contracting the virus, as well as about unknowingly spreading it.289
Disparity in virus treatment occurs with less access to medical resources needed to
prevent, detect, and treat COVID cases. Shortages in PPE needed to stop infections is one
of many structural factors making these communities more vulnerable. Put simply, fewer
hospitals, limited insurance, and reduced number of health services are all examples of how
limited medical resources characterize health inequity.290 These are products of systemic
racism.291 They suggest why colorblind responses to COVID will not work.292 These
contexts cannot be easily changed or avoided now that a pandemic exists. For example,
many people of color could not work from home in March when a national health
emergency was declared.293
There are many examples of how the health care system provides limited medical
attention to these communities. The most direct way this happens is when health care
workers ignore or dismiss patients, either because they are from minority groups or because
of their social class.294 Likewise, economic and structural forces exert their influence when
hospitals are closed in minority communities.295 This presents a compound set of problems,
with the elimination of care and then overburdening of any remaining medical care.296
These health disparities reflect long-term discrimination that existed before and will likely
286
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persist after the current pandemic.297 Gregorio Millett describes COVID’s racial disparities
as reflecting similar patterns with HIV, air pollution, cancer, and low birthrates.298
In sum, empirical studies illustrate how COVID disproportionately impacts Black,
Indigenous, and People of Color populations. Quantitative data analysis shows that these
communities have higher rates of virus contractions and COVID deaths.299 Medical
research confirms these higher rates by examining diagnoses, hospitalization, and mortality
trends among people of color.300 Demographic and labor analysis illustrate that minority
groups, immigrants, and non-white women are overrepresented in essential and frontline
jobs.301 This research into the healthcare system helps identify racial disparities in the
pandemic.
All of this data suggests that these communities need PPE to avoid COVID and to
continue working. It is logical to see PPE shortages or price rises as disproportionately
impacting populations of color in terms of virus exposure, disease susceptibility, and
COVID treatment. At this time, data needs to be gathered regarding the effect of PPE prices
and supplies on equipment used by those with COVID and by essential and frontline
workers. However, even without such data, Doctor Camara Phyllis Jones suggests how to
examine race and health: investigate the basis of race-associated differences in health
outcomes; acknowledge the relationship between race and social class, perpetuated by
racism; and identify the present-day impacts of racism.302 Following this lead, the empirical
studies mentioned along with the PPE crisis indicate that PPE shortages exemplify the
socioeconomic effects of trade policies and add to racial disparities in public health.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the pandemic hit the United States early in 2020, the need for PPE heightened,
just as inventories of face masks, gloves, and other items were increasingly scarce. An
existing trade war with China, a major supplier of these goods, aggravated this PPE crisis.
Since 2018, Section 301 tariffs have taxed PPE imports with additional duties of 7.5% to
25%.303 These added costs are paid by domestic importers and passed on to American
consumers.304 By 2020, tariffs resulted in increased prices and decreased imports for PPE
and medical supplies.305 The increase in PPE prices, for consumers and health
professionals, exemplifies the socioeconomic impacts of trade policies. It also
disproportionately impacts populations of color because they make up the majority of
essential workers and COVID cases and deaths.
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This Article analyzes America’s response to COVID-19 and the resulting PPE crisis
from legal, policy, and race-and-health perspectives. First, trade statutes provide the
executive branch expansive authority to increase tariffs. From this authority, the USTR can
impose Section 301 tariffs without significant checks from Congress or the courts.306 In the
China Case, tariffs were meant to compel changes in China’s IP and cyber theft practices.
American PPE inventories during COVID-19 were just one casualty of this trade war.
Second, with Section 301 the Trump administration prioritized tariffs over public health
readiness. For instance, the USTR did not remove PPE and medical equipment from
Section 301 tariff lists in 2018, did not approve various exclusions in 2019, and told
Congress that it prefers tariffs for PPE in 2020.307 In this context, tariffs impacted how
Americans lived through and worked during a pandemic.
Third, the trade war disproportionately impacts African Americans, Latinos, women,
and other groups. Limited PPE fuels virus exposure, with populations of color and nonwhite women overrepresented in essential and frontline jobs.308 Similar disparities exist
with susceptibility to the virus and limited health care resources in these communities.
These racial consequences are evidenced by quantitative studies and medical research on
COVID infections, hospitalizations and deaths; 309 demographic and occupational analysis
of essential workers; 310 and critical health scholarship.311 Taken together, they paint a
picture of how racial disparity afflicts the American COVID response. PPE scarcity or
spikes in PPE prices logically add to these inequities.
This Article argues for reforms to Section 301 and proposals in Congress to increase
PPE inventories and address COVID’s racial disparities.312 Similarly, the administration
could permit future PPE and medical imports to enter tariff-free, using its powers in Section
318.313 If implemented, all of these suggestions would help, but not quickly enough if there
is a pressing need for PPE. This is worrisome on trade and public health fronts. The trade
war with China shows no sign of abating. This keeps tariffs as the administration’s default
option. With COVID surges continuing, Americans will need PPE and medical supplies
from China. Tariffs will fuel a second PPE crisis. Already, PPE shortages look likely well
into 2021.314 Since August 2020, the FDA and General Accounting Office have issued
reports on PPE shortages.315 With the latest virus surges in the fall of 2020 and winter of
306
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2020-2021, new headlines tell the story of continued PPE scarcity.316 For the Biden
administration, the immediate lessons are: take prior PPE supply warnings seriously in
order to limit virus spread and COVID deaths; and certain trade policies, like the China
Case, can result in economic burdens for American consumers and fuel racial inequities in
health care.
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